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1. INTRODUCTION
Less skilled workers have suffered declines in relative wages, increased
unemployment and sometimes both in the OECD economies over the
1980s. In the United States the real wages of young men with twelve
or fewer years of education fell by 26 per cent between 1979 and 1993,
and have not recovered since.1 Between 1979 and 1992 the average
unemployment rate in European OECD countries increased from 5.4
per cent to 9.9 per cent2 and has remained high, with most of the
unemployment concentrated among unskilled workers. In the same
period, relative wages of less skilled workers declined slightly in several
OECD countries and sharply in others. Over the last few years several
authors have documented the decline in the relative wages of less
skilled workers in the US and the concurrent decline in their
employment in manufacturing (e.g., Murphy and Welch, 1992, 1993;
Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Blackburn,
Bloom and Freeman, 1990), and a number have documented similar
trends in wages, employment or unemployment in other OECD
countries (e.g., Freeman, 1988; Freeman and Katz, 1994; Katz and
Revenga, 1989; Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower, 1995; Davis, 1992;
Machin, 1996a;  Nickell and Bell, 1995). Over the past two decades,
despite the fact that rapid increases in the supply of skilled labour in
the OECD have made the less skilled increasingly scarce, their labour
market outcomes have clearly worsened.
The literature has proposed several reasons for this decline in the
demand for unskilled labour, including both Stolper-Samuelson effects
of increased exposure to trade from developing countries and skill-
biased (or unskilled labour saving) technological change (SBTC).
While there is no consensus, labour economists generally believe that
skill-biased technological change is the principal culprit. That belief is
2based on a combination of three factors: a) employment shifts to skill-
intensive sectors seem to be too small to be consistent with
explanations based on product demand shifts, such as those induced by
trade, or Hicks-neutral, sector biased technological change (Bound and
Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Berman, Bound and
Griliches, 1994 (BBG); Freeman and Katz, 1994); b) despite the
increase in the relative cost of skilled labour, the majority of US
industries have had within-sector shifts in the composition of
employment towards skilled labour (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz
and Murphy, 1992; BBG); and c) there appear to be strong, within-
sector correlations between indicators of technological change and
increased demand for skills (Berndt, Morrison and Rosenblum, 1994;
BBG; Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1997; Machin, 1996b; Machin, Ryan
and Van Reenen, 1996).
In this paper we make the stronger claim that skill-biased
technological change was pervasive in the OECD over the past two
decades, occurring simultaneously in most, if not all, developed
countries. Pervasiveness is important for two reasons: firstly, at the
current level of international communication and trade it is hard to
imagine major productive technological changes occurring in one
country without rapid adoption by the same industries in countries at
the same technological level. Thus pervasive SBTC is an immediate
implication of SBTC, which invites testing. If we did not observe
evidence of SBTC throughout the OECD, we would be forced to doubt
it occurred in any OECD country.
Secondly, the more pervasive the SBTC, the greater its potential
to affect relative wages. To illustrate this point consider a Heckscher-
Ohlin (H-O) model with small open economies and two factors of
production. In that context skill-biased technological change cannot
change the wage structure in an H-O model unless it is also sector-
biased. On those grounds, Leamer (1994, 1995, 1996) has objected to
the notion that SBTC is the dominant factor explaining the decline in
the demand for skilled labour. This critique is powerful, as the long run
H-O model is widely considered to be the relevant model for analyzing
3the effect on wages of the increased exposure of developed economies
to LDC manufacturing over the past few decades. (The long run is long
enough for factors to detach themselves from industries, allowing wages
to be set by perfectly elastic demand curves.3) However, as Krugman
(1995) has pointed out, pervasive skill-biased technological change
will affect relative wages, since an integrated world economy will
respond to such technological change as a closed economy would.
Under standard assumptions, including homothetic preferences, a
sector-neutral skill-biased technological change would release less
skilled workers from industries, depressing their relative wages.
Pervasive skill-biased technological change in the developed world
provides an explanation consistent with both increased wage premiums
for skilled workers and within-industry substitution towards skilled
workers. That conclusion generalizes to the large open economy H-O
model as well.
Pervasive SBTC has two testable implications: 
1) the within-sector shifts away from unskilled labour observed in
the US should occur throughout the developed world. 
2) These shifts should have been concentrated in the same industries
in different countries. 
Using data on the employment of production and non-production
workers in manufacturing for 10 OECD countries, we find evidence
consistent with both predictions. In all countries in our OECD sample
we find large-scale within-industry substitution away from unskilled
labour, despite rising or stable relative wages. Moreover, the cross
country correlations of within-industry increases in employment of
skilled workers are generally positive and often quite large. 
The manufacturing industries which experience the greatest skill
upgrading across our OECD sample are those we commonly associate
with the spread of microprocessor technology. They are electrical
machinery, machinery (including computers), and printing and
publishing. Together, these three account for 40 per cent of the within-
industry increase in the relative demand for skills. Case study evidence
reveals that all three of these industries underwent significant
4technological changes associated largely with the assimilation of
microprocessors.4 Casual empiricism suggests that the spread of
microprocessors within these and other manufacturing industries was
pervasive in the 1980s. This pattern, combined with the correlation of
skill upgrading with measures of technological change cited above,
provides further evidence that technological change is the driving force
behind increased demand for skill.
The little evidence we have from the developing world is also
consistent with the SBTC hypothesis. Several studies have found
increased relative wages of skilled labour in LDCs undergoing trade
liberalization, despite the Stolper-Samuelson prediction (Feliciano,
1995; Hanson and Harrison, 1995; Robbins, 1995). We examine a
larger sample of developing countries and check for evidence that
increased trade in the 1980s depressed the wages of skilled workers.
We find, on average, constant relative wages, despite the fact that the
proportion of skilled workers increased as fast in the rapidly growing
manufacturing sectors of the LDCs as in the shrinking manufacturing
sectors of developed countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we embed skill-biased
technological change in a H-O framework, examine possible
explanations for the decrease in skill demand and derive their
implications.  In section 3 we test the implications of the model,
presenting evidence on within-industry changes in the employment of
skills in OECD countries. We also examine how well the non-
production/production worker classification to education and
occupation based measures of skill. Section 4 presents further evidence
of pervasive technological change, describing common technological
changes across countries. In section 5 we discuss possible extensions
to developing countries. Section 6 concludes.
2. THE HECKSCHER-OHLIN FRAMEWORK 
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In this section we discuss a framework that allows both Stopler-
Samuelson effects and skill-biased technological change to influence
wages. Our purpose is to examine the roles of pervasiveness, factor bias
and ‘smallness’ in those mechanisms and to develop empirical
implications that will allow us to distinguish between causes. We start
with the two factor, small open economy version of Heckscher-Ohlin
trade theory with local technological change and then move on to
pervasive technological change and the model in which countries are
large enough to affect goods prices. 
Consider a version of the standard theory (Helpman and
Krugman, 1985) based on the following assumptions:
1) There are two factors, skilled and unskilled labour, l = S,U .
2) N goods are produced by constant returns to scale, quasi-concave
production functions with associated cost functions ci(w) , where
w is a vector of wages [ws, wu] and i = 1,2,......,N.
3) Perfect competition.
4) All goods are produced in equilibrium.
5) There are J$2  countries.
6) Factor endowments and technology allow factor price
equalization. 
7) Homothetic preferences.
Define the demand for factor l per unit of good i as ali(w). Under
cost minimization, it can be expressed as the derivative of a unit cost
function with respect to the wage of factor l
Now consider the ‘integrated equilibrium’ for all countries. Using XWi
to denote the world output level of good i and VW = [SW, UW] the
world endowments of factors, the equilibrium conditions are:
61. p i ' ci(w) for all i,
2. j
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The conditions state that 1) goods are priced according to marginal cost
as free entry of firms in any country and constant returns to scale
dictate zero profits, 2) factor markets clear and 3) commodity markets
clear.
The concept of an integrated equilibrium allows a convenient
comparison of labour demand under trade and autarky. Consider the
skill-abundant country with (S/U > SW/UW). In trade, the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Vanek theorem states that it will export services of its abundant
factor and import services of its scarce factor, thus the world price of
the skill abundant good must exceed the price under autarky.
Implication for within-industry demand for skills
The Stolper Samuelson Theorem states that an increase in the price of
the exported good will increase the return to the abundant factor (wS)
and decrease the return to the scarce factor (wU).5 So an opening up to
trade will increase wS/wU for a skill abundant country.
As a result, within each industry in the skill- (unskill) abundant
country, transition from autarky to trade will decrease (increase) the
demand for skilled workers.
To see this, note that:
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by cost minimization and the quasi-concavity of the underlying
production function. 
This is just an expression of the fact that for a single industry only
substitution effects are at work. Note that within-industry substitution
away from skilled workers will be compensated by a between-industry
shift in employment toward skill intensive industries, which increase
production for export. 
Sector-biased Technological Change
Consider the effect of a change in the technology of production so that
a skill-intensive sector becomes more efficient in a single country.
Leamer (1994) reproduces the result that only the sector-bias of a
technological change affects relative wages. That argument is most
clearly demonstrated by a Lerner diagram (Figure 1) which corresponds
to the zero-profit conditions (equilibrium condition (1) above) for the
two traded goods that allow factor price equalization. (Assumption 6
guarantees existence of two such goods.) In the diagram the curves C1
and C2 are unit cost combinations of inputs in production of goods 1
and 2 respectively. Assuming that these goods are traded, their prices
are taken as parameters under the small country assumption. The wage
ratio  wu/ws  consistent with cost minimization at zero profit is the
absolute value of the slope of the line AB tangent to unit cost curves
C1 and C2. Now consider a Hicks-neutral technological improvement
8in the production of good 1, the skill-intensive good, which shifts C1
to lower levels of inputs at C1'. This shift is Hicks-neutral since at the
old wage ratio the ratio of inputs  S/U  is unchanged. In the diagram
this is reflected by CD being parallel to AB. Because the technological
improvement occurred in the skill-intensive sector, it implies an
increase in output of good 1, and increased demand for skills. This is
expressed as a decreased relative wage of unskilled labour or a
shallower slope of the new line EF joining the points of tangency with
C1' and C2, the new equilibrium.
Note that, at the new equilibrium, the ratio of skilled to unskilled
labour is lower in each sector. This is due to substitution away from
skilled labour in each sector in response to an increase in the relative
wage of skills, as above.
Skill-biased Technological Change
A skill-biased technological change is an exogenous change in the
production function that increases the unit demand ratio aSi / aUi at the
current wage level. A sector neutral, skill-biased technological change
is illustrated in Figure 2 in the shift of unit cost curves C1 and C2 to
C1' and C2'. This change is sector neutral in the sense that both C1 and
C2 shift towards lower levels of inputs in a way which reduces costs by
the same proportion. The line CD, tangent to C1' and C2' reflects the
new zero profit condition, and is parallel to AB, reflecting the same
relative wages. These shifts are skill-biased as the new equilibrium
ratios skilled to unskilled workers are higher than the old. (Rays from
the origin are steeper.) While this sector neutral technological change
may seem artificial it provides a useful point of comparison in the
discussion below. Note that unlike sector-biased technological change
and Stolper-Samuelson effects, skill-biased technological change
directly increases the proportion of skilled labour employed in each
sector.
9Leamer Critique: Skill- vs. Sector-bias
One feature of technological changes in this model with fixed goods
prices is that only the sector bias of technological changes has any
effect on relative wages (Leamer, 1994). To see this, imagine sliding the
isovalue curve C1' along unit cost line so that the point of tangency
moves to a different ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. Any of those
locations represent the same level of costs for production of good 1, so
that the sector-bias of each of those technological changes is the same.
Though the skill-biases of those locations differ, they all share the same
solution for relative wages. Thus, in the small open economy model, a
skill-biased technological improvement has no effect on relative wages
except through the implied sectoral-bias. This argument appears
particularly damning for the widespread conclusion of the literature.
Local skill-biased technological change, the champion explanation of
increased wage inequality among most labour economists, cannot have
any effect on wages in the two factor Heckscher-Ohlin model with
small, open economies. 
Now consider a pervasive skill-biased technological change
occurring simultaneously in all economies in the production of some
traded good. In the integrated world economy, the response to such a
change would be like that of a closed economy. SBTC would cause a
disproportionate expansion of production of the good intensive in
unskilled labour (good 2) as each industry reduces its proportion of
unskilled labour. Under homothetic preferences that would induce a
decrease in the relative price of good 2 and in the relative wages of
unskilled labour. That decrease in the relative price of the good
intensive in unskilled labour is illustrated as a shift of the unit cost
curve from C2' to C2" as more inputs are required to provide the same
value of output. That shift implies a decrease in the relative wages of
unskilled labour, reflected in the slope of line EF, which is shallower
than that of CD. Thus pervasive, sector-neutral, skill-biased
technological change is a possible explanation for the increased skill
premium even in the small open economy model.6 Note that unlike the
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two alternative explanations of the increased skill premium, Stolper-
Samuelson effects and sector-biased technological change, it implies
within-industry increases in the proportion of skilled workers.
How general is the result? Consider relaxing the small economy
assumption in the integrated equilibrium. The more we allow local
conditions to affect world prices, the greater the effect of a local SBTC
in increasing the relative price of the skill-intensive good and the
relative wages of skilled labour.7 Analytically, pervasiveness and
bigness work in the same direction, allowing SBTC to affect relative
wages through their effect on world prices. By the same token, both
pervasiveness and bigness reduce the importance of sector-bias, as
productivity gains which produce the sectoral increase in input demand
are offset by reduced goods prices. Of course, barriers to free trade will
also tend to work in the same direction, making local prices and wages
more responsive to a local technological change and increasing the
ability of a SBTC to increase the local skill premium. In any case, the
effect of a pervasive SBTC on relative wages in the small open
economy H-O model is robust to making the economy larger or more
closed.
3. TESTING THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE
EXPLANATIONS
Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom
The US and the UK experienced the greatest increase in the skill
premium among developed countries in the 1980s.8 The manufacturing
sectors of both countries, in which most trade occurs, experienced large
reductions in employment and a trend increase in the share of non-
production workers in employment, as shown in Figure 3. We treat
non-production workers as skilled and production workers as
unskilled, and justify that classification below.
11
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Let Sni be the share of non-production workers in manufacturing
employment in industry i (Sni = Si / (Si + Ui). The analysis in Section 2
predicts that an increase in the relative wages of non-production
workers implies a decrease in Sni if the cause is a Stolper-Samuelson
effect or sector biased technological trade (biased toward the skilled
sector), whereas an increase in Sni, accompanied by an increase in the
relative wage, is evidence of pervasive skill-biased technological
change. Consider the average change in Sni, weighted by employment,
where Si is the employment share of industry i. Table 1 reports that for
American manufacturing the average annual increase in Sni (i.e., the
within-industry increase) is 0.387 percentage points between 1979 and
1987. For the UK the comparable figure is 0.301 between 1979 and
1990. In both countries relative wages of non-production workers
increased: in the US the non-production/production worker wage ratio
rose from 1.53 in 1979 to 1.57 in 1987 and to 1.64 in 1990; in the UK
the ratio rose from 1.31 in 1979 to 1.50 in 1990. Substitution of
production for non-production workers, despite the increase in their
relative wages, is evidence of skill-biased technological change in both
countries.9
To put these magnitudes into context, consider how much of the
aggregate increase in the proportion of non-production workers is due
to substitution within industries. The change in aggregate proportion of
non-production workers can be decomposed into two components, one
due to reallocation of employment between industries with different
proportions of skilled workers and another due to changes in the
proportion of skilled workers within industries:
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where an overstrike indicates a simple average over time. Table 1
reports that these within-industry components are not only positive, but
quite large, accounting for 70 per cent of the aggregate increase in the
US share of non-production workers and 82 per cent of the British. In
the presence of increased relative wages for skilled labour, the only
explanation we have from the model for that within-industry skill
upgrading is skill-biased technological change.10 11
A weakness in these measurements is that they require the strong
assumption that within observed industries a homogeneous good is
produced with identical production functions so that the response to
a relative wage change within an industry is a pure substitution effect.
Alternatively, each industry ‘within’ term could contain a number of
dissaggregated ‘between’ (between goods and production processes)
terms in it, allowing a composition effect that could reverse the
substitution effect. For example, increased skill intensity for the
exported high-skill product could occur if the industry is a combination
of high- and low-skill subindustries, so that opening up to trade caused
the high-skill subindustry to expand its share of production within the
industry.12 13  The second and fourth columns of Table 1 address this
concern by reproducing ‘within-between’ decompositions at the plant
level carried out by Dunne, Haltiwanger and Troske (1996) and
Machin (1996b), respectively. Here the potential for composition
effects is limited by looking at changes in employment within plants.
(A definitive decomposition of this type is impossible as changes in
goods prices could increase demand for skilled labour through
substitution across goods within plants while SBTC may also imply a
sector-bias, reducing the prices of skill-intensive goods and increasing
demand for skilled labour through shifts of production between goods
across plants.) Within-plant substitution toward non-production labour
accounts for 71 per cent of the aggregate substitution toward non-
production workers in the American LRD14 and for 83% in the British
WIRS. Following the implication of H-O theory we interpret this
substitution toward skilled labour within plants as evidence for SBTC,
despite an increase in relative wages.
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More concrete evidence that this within-industry (and within-
plant) skill upgrading reflects technological change is available from
three sources. Within-industry increases in the proportion of non-
production workers are correlated with indicators of technological
changes such as investments in computers, investment in R&D and
significant innovations (Berndt, Morrison and Rosenblum, 1994; BBG;
Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1997; Machin, 1996b; Machin, Ryan and
Van Reenen, 1996; Siegel, 1995).15 Case studies such as those
conducted by the BLS Office of Productivity and Technology can give
use some sense of the nature of the actual innovations involved (Mark,
1987). These often mention innovations that lowered, or are expected
to lower, production labour requirements. Along similar lines, as part
of the NBER -Sloan Plant Visit program, we saw evidence that
microprocessor technologies played a key role in allowing production
processes to be programmed, monitored and centrally controlled,
replacing tasks formerly performed for the most part by production
workers.
Examples from two plant visits can help illustrate skill-biased
technological change. We visited a metal fabrication plant where metal
was stretched and thinned to precise specifications by a large number
of machines working in parallel. The old technology involved one
operator per machine who monitored by eye, stopping and adjusting
the process when necessary. The new system allowed three machines
to be monitored and controlled by a single operator at a console, and
run three times as fast, resulting in a ninefold increase in labour
productivity. In a modernized steel mill we saw a steel rolling line
controlled by tens of operators and technicians at consoles in a
cavernous building that formerly housed thousands of production
workers. The new line ran faster and produced more output than the
old. In visits to several manufacturing plants in these and other
industries we saw evidence that microprocessor technologies played a
key role in allowing processes to be programmed, monitored and
centrally controlled, replacing tasks formerly performed for the most
part by production workers.
14
Outsourcing
A potential problem with the evidence cited above on within-industry
substitution toward skilled labour is that firms may ‘outsource’ low-
skill parts of the production process abroad, replacing in-house
production with imported materials. Imagine a production process
made up of high-skill and low-skill subprocesses. The H-O effect
would be to increase imports of the low-skill and exports of the high-
skill, increasing the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour in the aggregated
production process. This apparent contradiction of Stolper-Samuelson
is empty, since unskilled labour is replaced with imported materials.
While it is hard to measure such outsourcing, let alone its impact
on US employment, we have done some simple calculations which
suggest that outsourcing cannot be responsible for the bulk of the
changes we observe. The 1987 Census of Manufacturing included a
direct question regarding the purchase by establishments of foreign
materials. These data show that in 1987 the total cost of material
purchased by establishments from foreign sources was 104 billion
dollars, or 8 per cent of all materials purchased and 30 per cent of all
imported manufactured goods. Foreign materials purchased include
substitutes for domestically produced materials, as well as substitutes
for products that would have been produced within the purchasing
establishment’s own industry. While we know of no reliable way to
distinguish uses for the material purchased from foreign sources, we
note that census data show that only a small fraction (<10 per cent) of
purchased materials come from an establishment’s own industry.16  This
fact suggests that only a small fraction of foreign materials purchased
represent outsourcing (as they do not replace domestic production in
the same industry).
In our calculation we assume that imported materials displace
production but not non-production labour. In particular, we assume
that imported materials embody the same amount of production labour
as do domestically produced goods in the same industry, but no
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non-production labour. Thus, for each industry, we calculate that the
number of production workers displaced by outsourcing as of 1987 as
(imported materials/total shipments)  production employment.  These×
calculations suggest that the employment of production workers would
have been 2.8 per cent higher in 1987 had there been no outsourcing.
This translates into a 0.76 percentage point increase in production
workers’ share in total employment. Within-industry, production
workers’ share had dropped 4.22 percentage points between 1973 and
1987. Thus, this calculation would suggest that outsourcing could
directly account for 16 per cent of the decline in the production worker
share of employment that occurred over this time period.
While we expect that only a fraction of the materials that an
establishment purchases from foreign sources will represent
outsourcing, the Census category misses one dimension of outsourcing.
The census instructions state that “items partially fabricated abroad
which reenter the country” should not be included as “foreign
materials”. Such items would normally enter the country under items
806 and 807, schedule 8 of the Tariff Schedule of the United States. In
1987 the value of such items totaled a not insignificant 68.6 billion
dollars.  However, the automobile industry that accounted for only 3
per cent of total skill upgrading accounted for roughly two-thirds of
such imports. Eliminating both the auto industry and domestic content
of such items reduces the 68.6 billion to 14.0 billion or roughly 0.5 per
cent of the value of manufacturing shipments that year S too small a
quantity to matter very much (US International Trade Commission,
1988).
Outsourcing may be important in some industries. For example,
as of 1987, 806 and 807 imports represented 57 per cent of imports in
the auto industry and 44 per cent of imports of semiconductors. A
calculation similar to the one above suggests that these imports are
sufficient to account for more than 100 per cent of the shift away from
production workers that occurred in the auto industry and one-third of
the shift that occurred in semiconductors.17 However, the point is that
foreign outsourcing is concentrated enough in specific industries that
16
it is hard to imagine it can account for anything more than a small
fraction of the total within-industry shift away from production labour.
Our estimates are crude, but they err on the side of overestimating
the effects of outsourcing on demand for production workers: not all
foreign materials represent outsourcing. For those that do, some non-
production labour is certainly embodied in the domestic production
replaced by outsourcing. Still, these calculations suggest that while
outsourcing might be important for some industries, it cannot account
for the bulk of the skill upgrading that occurred within manufacturing
over the last two decades.18
A Correspondence between Measures of Skill
All of the work we discuss in this paper is based on manufacturing data
in which the only available measure of skill is the proportion of non-
production workers in employment. This measure is viewed with
skepticism by Leamer (1994), who points out that skilled jobs such as
line-supervisor, product development and record keeping are classified
as production worker jobs, while jobs such as sales delivery, clerical,
cafeteria and construction are classified as non-production.  BBG
defend the production/non-production classification, showing that the
proportion of non-production workers follows the same trend increase
as the proportion of skilled workers in U.S. manufacturing.19
A powerful new data set offers a way of examining how the
production/non-production classification compares to educational and
occupational measures of skill. The Worker Establishment
Characteristics Database (Troske, 1994), matches individuals from the
Census of Population in 1990 to plants in the Census of Manufactures
in 1989. Combining the educational and occupational information we
find a close correspondence between the different classifications of
skill: 75 per cent of non-production workers are in white collar
occupations, while 81 per cent of production workers are in blue collar
occupations. Details are given in the Appendix and in Table A1.
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While there seems to be lots of scope for the non-
production/production categories not to correspond with other
measures of skill, these are the exceptions rather than the rule. For the
educational and occupational categories in the Appendix Table A1,
they correspond quite well. This one cross section does not
conclusively demonstrate a correspondence between changes in the
proportion of non-production workers and changes in other measures
of skills, but we find it convincing enough to adopt the non-
production/production classification as our measure of skill.
Evidence from Manufacturing Sectors of the Developed World
If the dominant cause of increased relative wages of skilled workers in
the US and UK is pervasive SBTC, then it must be occurring in other
developed countries. The United Nations General Industrial Statistics
Database (United Nations, 1992) contains manufacturing employment
data for a large number of countries categorized into 28 consistently
defined industries. We are interested in the most productive economies
under the assumption that they are most likely to use the same
production technologies as the United States. From the set of countries
without data problems we define our developed sample as the top
twelve countries, ranked by GNP/capita in 1985. They range from the
United States ($16,910) to Belgium ($8290). Appendix Table A2 gives
the rankings. The table also reports employment shares of non-
production workers in manufacturing in the 1970s and 1980s. The non-
production employment share has generally increased in both the
1970s and 1980s in our developed sample. In eight of the twelve
countries total manufacturing employment fell through the 1980s.
Among the developed countries we study, the employment share
of skilled labour increased in all twelve in the 1970s and 1980s.
Relative wages of skilled labour either increased or remained constant
in most.20 A common description of European labour markets in the
1980s is that they share the same phenomenon of decreased demand
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for less-skilled workers but differ in how it is expressed. In the US and
UK where wages are flexible, the relative wages of the less-skilled
declined sharply, while in other countries collective bargaining and
minimum wages moderated the decline in relative wages but caused
high levels of unemployment.21
 Table 2 reports the increased proportion of non-production
workers in manufacturing employment and the percentage of that
increase due to within-industry components in the 1970s and 1980s.
Across countries with very diverse labour market institutions, two
common features stand out: 
1) an increased proportion of non-production labour in
manufacturing
2) substitution toward non-production workers within industries in
the 1980s, despite increased or flat relative wages of non-
production workers.
Not only was within-industry substitution positive, it was quite large,
accounting for most of the increase in the aggregate in all countries
(except Belgium where it accounts for 49 per cent). Large within-
industry skill upgrading, despite rising or constant relative wages, is
evidence of skill-biased technological change in each of these
countries. Taken together, they provide evidence for pervasive skill-
biased technological change in the developed world.
A limitation of this data is this 28 industry classification which is
much more aggregated than those reported in Table 1, allowing more
room for composition effects to masquerade as within-plant effects. But
note that the 28 industry ‘within’ figure for the US in Table 2 is only
3 per cent higher (as a proportion of the aggregate change) than the
comparable 450 industry figure in Table 1, so a 28 industry
decomposition may provide a good approximation of the substitution
and composition effects at the finer levels of disaggregation that we
report in Table 1.
In many of these countries within-industry skill upgrading
increased more in the 1970s than in the 1980s. However, this should
probably not be interpreted as evidence of an overall slow-down in the
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rate of SBTC. In most of these OECD countries the relative wages of
non-production workers decreased during the 1970s, but increased or
remained stable during the 1980s.22 These changes in relative wages
would tend to induce within-industry skill upgrading during the 1970s
and downgrading during the 1980s through substitution effects.
Without netting out these substitution effects (something that would be
hard to do), it is impossible to tell whether the rate of SBTC
accelerated, remained constant or decelerated during the 1980s.
(Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992). Similarly, we
are reluctant to interpret differences across countries in terms of the
rate of within-industry skill upgrading as evidence of cross country
patterns in the rate of technological change. Rather, these patterns
could plausibly reflect cross country differences in other factors that
effect wage setting. Some of the cross-country variation in changes in
the relative wages of non-production workers seems to be due to cross-
country variation in the supply of college educated workers. The
overall pattern is consistent with a trend increase in both supply and
demand of skills, with either accelerated demand or decelerated supply
in the 1980s increasing the skill premium, while local changes in
supply affects relative wages as well.
In summary, in the ten developed countries for which we have
manufacturing data in the 1970S90 period, we find widespread within-
industry substitution towards skilled labour despite either constant or
increased relative wages in the 1980s. Applying the predictions of the
analysis in the last section, this pattern indicates skill-biased
technological change in all of these countries.
4. CROSS-COUNTRY CORRELATIONS: A FURTHER TEST
OF PERVASIVE SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE
In this section we test implications of the pervasiveness of skill-biased
technological change. In section 2 we argued that the more pervasive
the SBTC, the greater its potential to affect relative wages. Casual
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empiricism suggest that microprocessors, the most likely source of this
technological change, have indeed become ubiquitous throughout the
OECD. The empirical literature has tied indicators of technological
change with substitution towards skilled workers such as investment in
R&D, significant innovations, increased investment in computers and
in other ‘high tech’ capital.23 In the previous section we showed
evidence for SBTC in our sample of OECD countries. Still, if SBTC is
pervasive, there is another testable implication that we can check. We
should find the same industries increasing their proportion of skilled
workers in different countries.
Cross-country Correlations
Pervasive skill-biased technological change implies that within-
industry changes in the use of skills be positively correlated across
countries producing that good. So we test for pervasive SBTC by
examining cross-country correlations of changes in the use of skills
(? Sn).
Table 3 presents a correlation matrix of corr(? Snci Sci, ? Snc'i Sc'i),
the cross-country within-industry changes in the share of non-
production workers for nine developed countries.24  Stars denote a
significant correlation at the 5 per cent level. Note that the correlations
are nearly all positive (34 of 36) and some are quite high. Indeed, 13
of the 36 are significant at the 5 per cent level. The shift toward
increased use of non-production workers has for the most part occurred
within the same industries in different countries.25
The cross-country correlations suggest that technological change
in several of the countries is quite similar. The strongest positive
correlation is between the UK and the US, but a group of countries
(especially Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the UK and the US) have very
similar within-industry changes in the proportion of non-production
employment. Consider the US on the one hand, and Sweden, Denmark
and Finland on the other. These are economies with very different
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labour market institutions and very different trade and macroeconomic
experiences in the 1980s. The similarity in the pattern of decreased use
of production workers despite their different experiences is compelling
evidence for common technological changes as an underlying cause of
decreased demand for unskilled labour.
Industries with Large Skill-biased Technological Change 
The industries that drive the correlations in Table 3 indicate what the
nature of these technological changes may be. Figure 4 displays the
scatterplot of US within-industry terms against those of the UK. The
US-UK correlation is mainly due to the large common increases in the
share of non-production employment in four industries: Machinery (&
computers), Electrical Machinery, Printing and Publishing and
Transportation.
A more systematic way of looking for industries with large effects
is to estimate industry effects in a country-industry panel. In a
regression of ‘within’ industry terms on country and industry
indicators,
the a i are the average industry terms once country means have been
removed. A well estimated industry effect will reflect a within term
common to many countries, while a large industry effect is evidence of
increased use of skills in at least one country-industry.
Table 4 reports the three largest of the statistically significant
estimated industry effects. Three industries: Electrical Machinery,
Machinery (& computers) and Printing & Publishing, together account
for 40 per cent of the average within-component across countries. A
full set of estimated industry effects is reported in Table A3. Case
studies indicate that these industries introduced significant skill-biased
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technologies during this period, especially in the automation of control
and monitoring of production lines.26 For example, a principal source
of SBTC in the printing and publishing industry was automated rather
than manual sorting and folding of newspapers.
 
5. GLOBAL SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE?
What about the developing world? According to the H-O approach, in
a country that is abundant in unskilled labour the opening-up to trade
that occurred in the 1980s should have a negative Stolper-Samuelson
effect on the relative wages of skilled workers. Thus H-O and SBTC
hypotheses have opposite predictions for relative wages in LDCs. The
literature reports that relative wages of skilled labour have risen in
some, though not all, LDCs  undergoing trade liberalizations in the
1980s (e.g., Feliciano, 1995; Hanson and Harrison, 1995; Robbins,
1996; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a).  Figure A1 reproduces that result
using the UN data, showing that a number of developing countries
experienced an increase in the relative wages of non-production
workers in manufacturing between 1980 and 1990. 
Stable and rising relative wages are particularly interesting,
considering that almost all of these countries experienced considerable
increases in the proportion of skilled labour in manufacturing over the
1980s, as illustrated in Figure A2.27 For the developing world, that
increase in the proportion of skilled labour was generally accompanied
by rapid growth in manufacturing employment (see Table A2 and
Wood, 1994). While H-O logic implies that increased trade should
reduce relative demand for skilled workers in LDCs, their
manufacturing sectors are expanding rapidly and upgrading skills at the
same time. Besides the effects of trade, some other effect must have
more than compensated to keep wages of non-production workers
stable especially as their proportion increased quickly in the 1980s.
Skill-biased technological change is one possible explanation. Other
causes could be increased investment and technology transfer,
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combined with capital-skill complementarity, or decreased protection
of industries intensive in unskilled workers. Nevertheless, these findings
raise the intriguing possibility that SBTC is at work in the developing
world as well as the developed.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have presented evidence that the kind of skill-biased
technological change which occurred in the US has been pervasive
across the OECD. Our data show that : a) substitution towards skilled
labour within industries occurred in all ten developed countries that we
studied in the 1970S90 period, despite constant or increasing relative
wages of skilled labour, and b) the same manufacturing industries that
substituted towards skilled labour in the US did so in other developed
countries as well. The industries with common, large within-industry
contributions to skill upgrading are machinery (& computers),
electrical machinery and printing & publishing. Together, these three
account for 40 per cent of the within-industry increase in the relative
demand for skills. Case studies reveal that all three of these industries
underwent significant technological changes associated largely with the
assimilation of microprocessors.
Based on this evidence alone, it would be hard to distinguish the
effects of SBTC from those of capital-skill complementarity. Previous
work (BBG) has found that capital accumulation in US manufacturing
was not large enough to generate the observed increase in relative
wages using cross-sectional estimates of the elasticity of substitution.
Similarly, it would be hard to distinguish the effects of SBTC from
those of a general increase in the quality of skilled labour, due to
improved sorting or improved human capital production. We feel that
pervasive improvements in the quality of skilled labour are unlikely
unless they are caused by some pervasive technological effect.
The debate in the literature over the effects of SBTC on relative
wages has often turned on the relevance of the small, open economy
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assumptions (Freeman (1995), Leamer (1996)). Pervasiveness allows
SBTC to reduce the relative wages of the unskilled even in a model that
assumes small, open economies because its occurrence in a large
number of countries allows analysis of the integrated equilibrium as if
the OECD were a closed economy. In the context of that model, to
calculate the size of the effect of different factors, we must gauge their
relative effects on world goods prices. The relative price of skill-
intensive to low-skill-intensive goods is in turn set by the factor content
embodied in increased supplies of goods to the OECD. Using the
American experience as a guide we see that the factor content of SBTC
in manufacturing alone implies a decrease in the proportion of less
skilled (production) workers about eight times that attributable to
increased trade. Referring back to Table 1, in the 1979S87 period,
during which demand for less-skilled workers dropped sharply in the
US, the factor content of SBTC accounts for at least 70 per cent of the
displacement of unskilled workers (i.e. the increase in the proportion
of skilled workers) in U.S. manufacturing. The factor content of trade
accounts for about 9 per cent (BBG, Table IV) in the US.28  For the
OECD as a whole, 70 per cent would be a typical figure for SBTC, but
9 per cent would be generous for the effects of trade as the US
experienced a much greater increase in trade with the developing world
than OECD as a whole. Assuming that demand elasticities are
approximately the same for imports and domestic production, that
calculation implies that the effects of SBTC on relative wages are an
order of magnitude larger than those of increased trade with the
developing world.
Even if pervasive SBTC is a principal explanation, there is no
reason to believe that it is the sole explanation for increased relative
demand for skills. Stolper-Samuelson effects and institutional changes,
such as decreased unionization and decreased minimum wages, all
occurred during this period and undoubtedly contributed to increased
relative demand for skills, though the evidence weighs against any of
these causes as a principal explanation. Deviations of the supply of skill
from a long run trend increase also play a role in determining relative
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wages. European OECD countries do show considerable variation in
the rate of growth of skill supply which appears to be negatively
correlated with changes in their skill premia in the 1980s, suggesting
that the H-O short run can last for long enough for supply effects to be
observed. In an integrated equilibrium long-term fluctuations in supply
of skilled labour in the entire OECD will affect relative wages. This is
an interesting topic for future research.
Though the evidence we present is only from manufacturing,
where measurement is easiest, the effects of SBTC on wages may be
just as important in the service sectors. In retail and financial services,
for example, microprocessor based information processing technologies
have dramatically changed accounting and secretarial work (Levy and
Murnane, 1996). At a more aggregate level, Bound and Johnson
(1992), Murphy and Welch (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992) all
present evidence of within-industry skill upgrading in other sectors,
despite increased relative wages of skilled workers. This within-industry
skill upgrading outside of manufacturing also occurred in the same
industries in the US and the UK. The correlation of within-industry
terms between the US and UK across the 15 industries outside of
manufacturing is 0.93.29 That high correlation is largely due to very
rapid skill upgrading in financial services in the two countries. Skill-
biased technological change outside of manufacturing may have also
been pervasive and is an additional likely cause of decreased demand
for less skilled workers.
Pervasive skill-biased technological change suggests several
avenues for interesting research. The source of SBTC, its rate of flow
across borders, the identification of the technologies involved and
especially the likely implications for labour demand in the receiving
country are all interesting and relevant. This is especially true for
developing countries in which technological changes could exacerbate
current high levels of income inequality.
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APPENDIX
A CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MEASURES OF SKILL
The Worker Establishment Characteristics Database, constructed at the
Center for Economic Studies (Troske, 1994), matches individuals from
the Census of Population in 1990 to plants in the Census of
Manufactures in 1989. For 2490 large manufacturing plants we have
information from the Census of Population about the demographics of
a sample of employees. Using the educational and occupational
information we construct estimates of the number of employees in each
education or occupation category in a plant. A regression of these
estimates on the number of production and non-production workers in
a plant allows estimation of the distribution of non-production
(production) workers across educational and occupational categories.
Let the probability that a worker is in educational category j
conditional on being a non-production (production) worker be ßjn (ßjp).
The expected number of type j workers in a plant is Ej = ßjnEn + ßjpEp,
where En and Ep are the number of production and non-production
workers, respectively. We have Xj, a noisy measure of Ej (the true 1989
employment figure). A regression of Xj on En and Ep estimates ßjn and
ßjp.
Table A1 reports estimates for education and occupation groups.30
The restriction that the sum over categories j of ßjn (ßjp) is one has been
imposed. Looking at the educational distribution, the median non-
production worker has some college, with 66 per cent having some
college or more education. The median production worker has a high
school education, with 61 per cent having high school or less.
Occupational categories show an even closer correspondence to the
production/non-production classification. 75 per cent of non-
production workers are in white collar occupations (48 per cent are
managers and professionals, 25 per cent are technicians, in sales or in
administrative support and 2 per cent are in services). 81 per cent of
production workers are in blue collar occupations.31
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A possible explanation for this close correspondence is that
Census of Manufactures respondents ignore the definitions and classify
hourly workers as production and salaried workers as non-production,
which corresponds more tightly with the other measures of skill than
do the definitions. If that is the case, the correspondence may hold
between changes in the proportion of non-production workers and
changes in other measures of skills as well.32
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1. Calculated for high school graduates with 5 years of labour
market experience in Current Population Survey from Bound and
Johnson (1995), table 1.
2. Source: OECD (1992, 1993). For specific countries, the 1979S92
increases in unemployment were: 5.0 per cent to 10.1 per cent
(U.K.);  3.2 per cent to 7.7 per cent (Germany);  7.6 per cent to
10.7 per cent (Italy);  5.9 per cent to 10.2 per cent (France). All
are considerably larger than the American increase from 5.8 per
cent in 1979 to 7.4 per cent in 1992.
3. The H-O model has been criticized, as its property of perfectly
elastic labour demand curves is inconsistent with evidence that
labour supply affects wages (Freeman (1995)). One way to
reconcile those two views is to recognize that the H-O model
applies only in the long run, so that the short and long run effects
of a local SBTC or of an increase in trade may differ. Since the
trend increase in relative demand for skilled labour seems to have
persisted for decades, long run models deserve consideration.
4. US Department of Labor, 1982a, 1982b, 1986.
5. To see this fully in the N=2 case differentiate (1) to get dw= A-1
dp since dAw=0 by cost minimization. The result follows from A
being positive semi-definite. For N>2, a positive definite 2x2
matrix exists by assumption 6, and its inverse is used.
6. Homothetic preferences are sufficient but not necessary for the
increased skill premium. Krugman (1995) points out that a limit
on the cross-elasticity of demand will do.
7. For a clear graphical presentation of this argument see Baldwin
(1994). The integrated equilibrium behaves like the closed
economy analyzed in Jones (1965).
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8. The US college/HS ratio for males increased by 14% in 1979S89.
The UK non-manual/manual wage ratio increased by 15% for
men and 23% for women in 1979S91 (see Katz, Loveman and
Blanchflower, 1995).
9. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) present the same argument for
the U.S. These results are from Berman, Bound and Griliches
(1993,1994) and Machin (1996b), who make similar arguments.
10. Capital skill complementarity is a possible explanation in a more
general model of production. In previous work BBG found that
it accounts for very little skill upgrading in US manufacturing.
11. Clearly SBTC could account for between industry skill upgrading
as well.
12. Wood (1991) and Bernard and Jensen (1993) raise this point and
the symmetric argument for importing industries.
13. A similar objection is that within industries (or plants) the
product mix may respond to changes in international prices with
more skill-intensive goods substituted for less skill-intensive,
creating apparent within-industry skill upgrading. BBG (1994)
find only very small correlations between within-industry
upgrading and increased imports, indicating very little skill
upgrading due to shifts in final product mix.
14. Bernard and Jensen (forthcoming) perform a similar
decomposition on a balanced panel of plants in the LRD rather
than the Census sample and find a smaller within plant
proportion of 54% for the 1979S87 period. Dunne et al (1996)
attribute the difference in results to the use of sampling weights
to impute values for unobserved plants in the LRD and to the
choice of period. 
15. In contrast, Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997) find that skill
upgrading is not positively correlated with a measure of adoption
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of specific technologies.
16. Data drawn from the materials files of the 1987 Census of
manufacturing shows that 2 per cent of materials purchased
originate in the same four-digit industry as purchased the
material. 7 per cent  originate in the same three-digit industry. 
17. Figures on the overseas production of semiconductors (U.S.
International Trade Commission, 1982) are consistent with these
calculations.
18. Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) use a somewhat different method
to estimate the magnitude of foreign ‘outsourcing’. Using census
of manufactures data, they multiply materials purchased by the
proportion of imports in their source industry. Their estimate is
that 11.5% of materials could represent outsourcing, rather than
the 8% reported by BBG. Feenstra and Hanson emphasize that
contract work could explain the difference between these
estimates, since it is included in imports, but not in imported
materials. Nevertheless, both figures are likely to be substantial
overestimates, as most imported materials probably do not
replace in house production. Using regression techniques,
Feenstra and Hanson estimate that outsourcing can account for as
much as 51 per cent of the within-industry shift away from
production labour. However, given the calculation reported in the
text, this estimate seems improbably large. What is more, in
unpublished work Baru (1995) uses regression techniques and
measures similar to those used by Feenestra and Hanson, but
when calculating her measure of outsourcing, Baru uses only
purchases within the same three digit industry. She finds no
association between her more narrowly defined measure and skill
upgrading.
19. Sachs and Shatz (1994) also discuss the suitability of a
production/non-production classification as a  measure of skill in
their appendix.
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20. The US, UK, Austria and Denmark experienced large increases in
the skill premium.  Australia, Japan and Sweden had modest
increases.  Germany and Italy had no change.  Finland had a
modest decrease and Belgium had a large decrease.  We lack
information about Norway and Luxembourg.  (Freeman and Katz
(1994) supplemented by calculations for manufacturing from UN
data for countries not covered in the former.)
21. Freeman and Katz (1995) and Krugman (1995) offer this
interpretation of inequality in OECD labour markets.
22. These effects, in turn, are likely to be a symptom of decelerating
skill supply.  While all these countries show a trend increase in
the proportion of college educated in the labour force in the
1970s, that proportion decelerated almost uniformly in the 1980s
(OECD, 1995; Barro and Lee, 1997).  In the short run or in an
integrated equilibrium, supply can affect relative wages even if the
small open economy assumptions of section 2 apply in a longer
run.
23. Berndt, Morrison and Rosenblum (1994), BBG, Machin (1996b).
24. Luxembourg has been dropped as it has only six observed
industries in this period.  Norway and Germany was dropped for
lack of employment share figures in 1980S90.
25. Other authors have found similarities between manufacturing
sectors in differenct countries.  Both Katz and Summers (1989)
and Krueger and Summers (1987) have found that the wages of
workers in the same manufacturing industry have high positive
correlations across countries.
26. US Department of Labor, (1982a, 1982b).
27. Widespread skill upgrading in the developing world is also
reported in a literature survey by Davidson (1995).
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28. For a justification of the use of factor content calculations in
approximating the effects of trade flows on relative wages, see
Krugman (1995) or Deardorff and Staiger (1988).
29. The measure of skill is post-secondary education in this
calculation.  Authors’ calculation from the US Current
Population Survey and the UK Labour Force Survey, 1981S91.
30.  We thank Ken Troske for performing this analysis.
31. The intercept terms in this regression should be zero.  Their
significant difference from zero may be due to a correlation
between the proportions (ß’s) and plant size.  Note that the
intercept is an out-of-sample prediction for large plants so light
effects of size on ß’s may cause large shifts in the intercept.
32. Unfortunately, we could not check the plant level
correspondence of measures of skill in other countries.  A similar
exercise at the 2 digit industry level using manufacturing and
labour force surveys indicates that the correlation of non-
production/production categories with educational categories is
similar in the UK to that in the US (Machin, Ryan and Van
Reenen, 1996).
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TABLE 1  
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE IN THE UK AND THE US
IN THE 1980s
 United States United Kingdom
Time Period 1979S87 1977S87  1979S90 1984S90
Number of Industries/
Plants
450 360,000    100 402
Level of aggregation 4-digit SIC plants 3-digit SIC plants
Data Source Annual Survey
of Manufactures
Census of 
Manufactures
Census of
Production
Workplace
Industrial
Relations
Survey
Annual Change in
Non-production
Employment Share 
(in percentage points)
0.552 0.483 0.367 0.41
Within-industry/plant
component (per cent)
.387
(70)
.3411
(71)
.301 
(82)
0.34
(83)
Between-industry/plant
component (per cent)
.165
(30)
.077
(16)
.066 
(18)
0.07
(17)
Annual Change in
Non-production Wage
Bill Share
0.774 - 0.668 -
Within-industry/plant
component (per cent)
.468
(60)
- .554 
(83)
-
Between-industry/plant
component (per cent)
.306
(40)
- .114 
(17)
-
Note: 1.  The Dunne et al (1996) decomposition also includes a small negative cross-
product term and a positive net entry term for the effect of entering and exiting
plants.
Sources: UK S Machin (1996b), Tables 7.2, 7.3;  US industries S Berman, Bound and
Griliches (1994), Table IV, US plants S Dunne, Haltiwanger and Troske (1996)
Table 1.
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TABLE 2
PROPORTION OF INCREASED USE OF SKILLS "WITHIN"
INDUSTRIES
Country Change  in %
non-production
1970S80
(annualized)
% within
1970S80
Change in %
non-production
1980S90
(annualized)
% within
1980S90
Note
US 0.20 81 0.30 73
Norway 0.34 82 . . 1970,80,n/a
Luxembourg 0.46 112 0.30 143
Sweden 0.26 70 0.12 59
Australia 0.40 87 0.36 99 1970,80,87
Japan . . 0.06 121 n/a*,81,90 
Denmark  0.36 83 0.41 87 1970,80,89
Finland  0.42 83 0.64 79
W. Germany 0.48 89 . . 1970,79,n/a
Austria 0.46 89 0.19 73
UK 0.41 91 0.29 94
Belgium 0.46 59 0.32 49 1970,80,85
Notes: The proportion within is the sum over 28 industries of (dnit * Si)/dPnt
in period t where Si is [(Empit/Empt)+(Empit-1/Empt-1)]/2, the share of
manufacturing employment in industry i, averaged over time.
* The sampling frame changed for Japanese data between 1970 and
1981.
Source: United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database.
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TABLE 3 
CROSS-COUNTRY CORRELATIONS OF WITHIN-INDUSTRY
CHANGES IN PROPORTION NON-PRODUCTION: 1980-90
US Sweden Australia Japan Denmark Finland Austria UK
Sweden
 
.43*  
(.02)
Australia
.28
(.14)
.19 
(.34)
Japan
.32
(.11)
.02
(.94)
-.22
(.26)
Denmark
.73*
(.00)
.36
(.06)
.37
(.05)
.33
(.09)
Finland
.59*
(.00)
.39*
(.04)
.51*
(.01)
.14
(.47)
.80*
(.00)
Austria
.22
(.26)
-.17
(.37)
.52*
(.01)
.12
(.54)
.51*
(.00)
.46*
(.01)
UK
.76*
(.00)
.18
(.36)
.51*
(.01)
.19
(.32)
.76*
(.00)
.64*
(.00)
.61
(.00)
Belgium
.18
(.44)
.00
(.99)
.01
(.97)
.22
(.37)
.11
(.63)
.09
(.71)
.37
(.10)
.15
(.53)
Notes:
1. These are cross-country correlation coefficients of within-industry changes in
non-production employment shares, 
where  i  is an industry index and  c  is a country index.
2. The number in brackets is the significance level of a test that the correlation is
zero. Standard errors in parentheses. A * denotes a significant correlation at the
5 per cent level. 
3. The sample was restricted to countries with GNP/capita of over $8000 US in
1985 (the top 12 in Table A2) and over twenty consistently defined industries
observed in 1980-1990.
4. The 28 industries in this classification are listed fully in Appendix table A3.
5. All correlation coefficients are calculated using a full set of 28 industries, except
those involving Japan (27 observations), Belgium (20 observations) and Japan &
Belgium (19 observations).
Source:  United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database.
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TABLE 4
SELECTED INDUSTRY EFFECTS IN WITHIN-INDUSTRY TERMS:
1980-90
In a regression of ‘within’ industry terms on country and industry indicators,
the following industry effects are statistically significant and represent more than
10% of the within component of the increase in the proportion of Non-production
workers in employment. A full set of industry effects are reported in Table A3.
Industry Industry Effect 
/Within Component
Avg share of industry in
employment
Printing & publishing .100
(.041)
.061
Machinery 
(incl. computers)
.146
(.045)
.117
Electrical Machinery .156
(.037)
.096
Sum
 (3 industries)
.402 .273
Number of observations
Root MSE
249
.116284
Notes: 1. Data are scaled so that the estimated coefficient represents the ratio of
the industry effect to the cross country average "within" component.
 2. The root mean squared error of the left-hand side variable is .126295.
 3. Standard errors are calculated using the White heteroskedasticity
robust formula.
Source: United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database.
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TABLE A1 
WHAT IS A NON-PRODUCTION WORKER IN US
MANUFACTURING?
Education group
(highest level
achieved)
constant non-
production
production R-square
<HS 9.82 .01 .03 .28
(1.05) (0.01) (.001)
HS 35.52 .23 .58 .91
(5.33) (.004) (.005)
Some College -20.96 .30 .30 .93
(2.71) (.003) (.004)
College- 15.06 .31 .07 .81
4 year dg. (3.58) (.004) (.005)
>College -9.31 .15 .01 .68
(>4 yr dg.) (2.13) (.002) (.003)
Note: Calculated from the Worker-Establishment Characteristics Database for 2490
large plants. The left-hand side variable in each row is the estimated number
of workers of that type in the firm. The right-hand side variables are the
number of production and Non-production workers. Coefficients are
interpreted as the proportion of Non-production (production) workers of
each type. Each column of coefficients is restricted to sum to one. We thank
Ken Troske for performing this calculation.
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TABLE A1 (Continued) 
WHAT IS A NON-PRODUCTION WORKER IN US
MANUFACTURING?
Occupation groups:
(occ codes)
constant non-
production
production
Mgr & Prof -20.72 .48 .08
(<=199) (5.27) (.005) (.006)
Tech, Sales & Admin. Support 18.74 .25 .08
(203-389) (2.17) (.002) (.003)
Service -0.76 .02 .03
(403-469) (0.54) (.001) (.001)
Farm-Forest & Fish 0.15 .001 .000
(473-499) (.06) (.0001) (.0001)
Precision Prod -21.64 .11 .33
(503-699) (2.86) (.003) (.004)
Operators & Fabricators 11.42 .10 .38
(703-791) (3.99) (.003) (.005)
Labourers 12.82 .03 .10
(1.95) (.002) (.003)
Note: Calculated from the Worker-Establishment Characteristics Database for
2490 large firms. The left-hand side variable in each row is the estimated
number of workers of that type in the firm. The right-hand side variables
are the number of production and Non-production workers. Coefficients
are interpreted as the proportion of Non-production (production) workers
of each type. Each column of coefficients is restricted to sum to one. We
thank Ken Troske for performing this calculation.
